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Abstract 
Previous work has shown that the results of both China and Mexico’s export-led market 
reforms over the past quarter century have been strikingly different.  In contrast to China, 
Mexico has not managed to increase the value added of its exports of manufactured 
goods and has subsequently had a difficult time competing with China in world markets.  
Building on this previous work, in this paper we conduct a comparative analysis of the 
role of government policies in industrial learning and the development of capabilities of 
indigenous firms in Mexico and China in order to shed light on why China is so 
outperforming Mexico. We find that Mexico and China have had starkly different 
approaches to economic reform in this area.  Mexico’s approach to reform has been a 
“neo-liberal” one, whereas China’s could be described as “neo-developmental.”  
Mexico’s hands-off approach to learning has resulted in a lack of development of 
endogenous capacity of domestic firms, little transfer of technology, negligible progress 
in the upgrading of industrial production, and little increase in value added of exports. By 
contrast, China has deployed a hands-on approach of targeting and nurturing domestic 
firms through a gradual and trial and error led set of government policies. 
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Introduction  
There are striking similarities between China and Mexico’s economic development over 
the last quarter century. There are also significant differences. Like Mexico, China’s 
economic model was not performing and there was a need for economic reform and 
export promotion. Like Mexico, China was a one-party state during the period of reform 
(Mexico democratized in 2000, however).  Like Mexico, China has sought to attract 
foreign direct investment (FDI) into manufacturing and high technology sectors to gain 
access to technology. Both countries have expanded export of manufactured goods, 
particularly in high or information technology industries (IT hereinafter).  
 
 As we will see, this is where the similarities end.  China’s annual average per 
capita growth rate has topped 8 percent over this period, where Mexico’s has been barely 
over one percent. China’s annual average growth rate in manufacturing value added has 
been well over ten percent since 1980, whereas Mexico has been closer to 3 percent. 
China is becoming the manufacturing powerhouse of the world economy and an 
increasing source of innovation, moving up the technology ladder from assembly-based 
manufacturing activity.  In Mexico manufacturing remains at the low end of the 
technology ladder and is losing its competitiveness relative to China (Gallagher and 
Porzecanski 2008; Gallagher, Moreno-Brid, and Porzecanski 2008; Pizarro and 
Shafaeddin 2007; Dussel Peters 2005, 2007) .   We show that Mexico’s performance is in 
part a function of a neo-liberal mindset that sees a very limited role for the state while 
integrating into the world economy.  China on the other hand, followed a pro-active 
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strategy for its globalization pursuits.  Mexico’s route to international integration has 
come at the expense of industrialization and learning, China’s pro-active approach has 
made it the manufacturing powerhouse of the world economy. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the extent to which government policies 
toward industrial learning for enhancing value added in exports and subsequent 
development have differed in the two countries over the past quarter century. The paper 
is divided into four parts in addition to the introduction. Following this brief introduction 
Part I is a short literature review on industrial learning.  Part II examines the cases of 
Mexico, Part III analyzes China. Part IV summarizes our main findings and draws 
lessons for research and policy. 
 
I. The role of learning in industrialization 
 
Regardless of the theoretical framework deployed, the role of learning in capacity 
building is seen as paramount for industrial development. Yet, the literature has two 
poles. On one end, the proponents of governments playing a strong role in 
industrialization stress “learning-by-doing". By contrast, those in favor of market-led 
industrialization believe in the contribution of “learning through trading”.  
 
A neo-developmentalist approach argues that it contributes to industrialization 
through “learning-by-doing" and experience. By contrast, neo-classical or neo-liberal 
approaches argue that industrialization come from “learning through trading”. The basic 
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difference between the two is that the first group favors government intervention, while 
the second one argues for the operation of market forces without government 
interference.   
 
In the neo-classical theory of international trade, technological knowledge and 
information is freely available, diffusion knowledge is costless, instantaneous and 
automatic; there is no significant learning process and its development of technology is 
riskless. All markets are competitive, comparative advantage is determines by factor cost. 
As the existence of increasing return and barriers to entry are assumed away, there is no 
need, for the late-comers, to invest in human capital and to intervene in the market to 
promote knowledge intensive products which are produced by established firms. Further, 
there are no static or dynamic externalities. Production costs in different products are not 
interdependent; there are no spill-over effects. Similarly, there are no inter-temporal 
relations between present income/costs and future income/costs as experience has no 
place in cost/income determination.  In nutshell, as there is no market and institutional 
failure, there is no need for any policy intervention. 
 
The importance of learning and knowledge accumulation has been emphasized in 
the post-war and modern theoretical and empirical literature since the publication of the 
pioneering article on learning-by-doing by Arrow (1962). To him, the acquisition of 
knowledge is products of experience which grows in time. The need for government 
intervention in learning by doing is articulated in "capability building theory". The theory 
of capability building (TCB) is built on the infant industry argument of Frederick List 
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according to which “mental capital”, or the accumulation of knowledge and experience, 
is regarded as the main element of “productive power” [development] and 
industrialization. Industrialization in newcomer countries would not take place according 
“to the natural course of things” (through the operation of market forces alone) and 
government policies should aim, inter alia, at learning at both the industry and country 
levels (see Shafaeddin 2005: 50 for details)1. The importance of learning and experience 
in industrialization has been also emphasized by (Linder 1961; Krugman 1984; Nelson 
and Winter 1982) and others.   
 
 The theoretical and empirical literature on TCB theory is vast2. One strand, the 
evolutionary theory of TCB, is most relevant for developing countries.  The evolutionary 
version of TCB draws not only on the infant industry argument but also on the evolutionary 
theory of change (Nelson and Winter 1982) and new growth theory (see: Lucas 1988; 
Romer 1986, 1987). Scholars3 of this version of TCB regard technological capabilities 
(learning) and technology absorption and diffusion, as the backbone of industrialization and 
international competitiveness (e.g. Teubal 1987). They define technological capabilities 
(TCs) in a very broad sense at all levels of activities of firms (i.e. beyond the technique of 
production) "as the information and skills - technical, organizational and institutional-that 
allow productive enterprises to utilize equipment and information efficiently" [italics added] 
throughout the  value chain (Lall 1993: 7). Evolutionary theory also considers the interaction 
of a firm with other firms and the external environment in obtaining inputs, in the sale and 
marketing of its products, and particularly in the innovation of new products and processes.  
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In contrast to neoclassical theory, under TCB technology is not freely available; the 
market fails to develop technological capabilities automatically due to reasons of dynamic 
externalities and linkages, lack of information, uncertainties, risks and missing and 
malfunctioning markets. Technological learning involves costs and takes time. It does not 
take place instantaneously because the required learning is a long, costly and evolutionary 
process. It requires purposeful efforts by enterprises as well as government to pursue 
policies for capability building through R&D, development of knowledge and 
organizational change, particularly at early stages of industrialization (Schmitz and Hewitt 
1991: 190; Teubal 1996: 449; Moore 1997: 516).  Government policies should be both 
functional and selective. Selective and targeted intervention is, in particular necessary 
because learning is technology specific, firm specific and activity specific, and 
technologies differ in their tacit features and externalities (Lall 2005). Further, all 
activities and industries can not be developed at the same time because of the scarcity of 
skills and other resources (Shafaeddin 2005).  
 
R&D for development of domestic technological capabilities and upgrading is the 
backbone of the TCB. R&D is seen as being so important that even some neoclassical 
economists advocate direct subsidization of knowledge acquisition and R&D (Baldwin 
1969). The experience of many developing countries with traditional import substitution 
indicate that learning from experience alone is not sufficient for building-up necessary 
technological capabilities; appropriate policies are required to overcome market failures 
constraining development of technological capabilities 4 (Bell, Ross-Larson, and Westphal 
1984). In fact, in the case of Asian NICs, government policies and close cooperation 
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between the government and the private sector were crucial in promoting technological 
capabilities for industrialization and upgrading and for remedying the related obstacles 
(see e.g. Lall 2005).  
 
 In the age of globalization government action to enhance firm’s capabilities to 
achieve competitive advantage becomes more important than before because the 
minimum entry barriers and skill requirement have become higher and risks involved in 
entry of firms of developing countries into new activities has increased (Archibugi and 
Michi 1997: 121; Shafaeddin 2005; Lall 2005). FDI may provide certain skill and 
marketing channels for exports. Further, it is argued that when an economy opens up to 
trade and FDI, an initial period of imitation will lead to a large catch-up opportunity 
followed by a shift towards innovation “as the knowledge gap is reduced and the 
economy’s technical maturity rises” (Elkan 1996).  However, a test of the impact of FDI 
on the industrialization of a developing country is its impact on development of local 
capabilities through spillover channels of demonstration effects, training effects and 
linkages effects (Paus 2005). Such capabilities can be influenced, inter alia, by learning, 
experience, skill development and the accumulation of knowledge by the labour force of 
the host country. Generally speaking the findings of literature on the spillover effects of 
the FDI on the host country is mixed (for a comprehensive review of this literature see: 
Görg and Greenaway 2004).  
 
 While learning and technological development are firm specific, they are also 
activity specific. For example, “the learning curve differs across quite similar products 
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such as distinct types of memory chips” (Gruber 1992: 885). IT industries which started 
through assembly operation in both Mexico and China are both supply dynamic and 
demand dynamic. They are supply dynamic because they can provide important linkages 
with other industries and their learning effects in the economy. They are demand dynamic 
because international trade in these products has been expanding rapidly during recent 
decades.  Therefore, while looking at the general process of processing industries in 
Mexico and China, we will, in particular, look into development of these industries.  
 Our aim in this paper is  to investigate what policies have contributed to the 
success of China in knowledge accumulation necessary for enhancing local value added 
in exports which have been absent in the case of Mexico. R&D will be of our main focus 
although some other contributing factors to development of capability of local firms will 
be discussed as well.  
 
II.  From Learning to Hoping: Mexican Industrial Strategy under NAFTA  
 
Mexico’s industrial strategy has been radically transformed over the past quarter 
century.  The goal has remained the same: “catch-up” with the industrialized world in 
industrial technologies and capabilities.  However, the means have changed.  Up until 
1984 the core of meeting the nation’s objectives centered around a government-led model 
of learning, since that time the core means to industrialization has been market-led.  This 
section of the paper shows that whereas in the first period Mexico actively pursued the 
development of technological capabilities through government policy (though not very 
successfully), in recent decades government policy has been restricted to creating an 
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environment for foreign investment and hoping that FDI would bring technological 
know-how that would automatically spill over into the broader economy. Mexico had an 
advantage over China in having privileged market access to the USA through NAFTA 
since 1995. 
 
 Over both periods Mexico has certainly aimed at becoming an industrialized 
country. Mexico has diversified away from an economy primarily based on primary 
products, has received unprecedented amounts of FDI, and has significantly boosted 
exports. However, these inroads have come at considerable cost.  Mexico has become 
plagued by a lack of linkages between foreign firms and the domestic economy, painfully 
low levels of technological capacity building, low valued added in exports of 
maquilladora sector, an overdependence on the United States as a chief export market, 
and a lack of competitiveness vis- a- vis China. 
 
ISI and Industrial Learning 
 
In Mexico and elsewhere, the tools of ISI focused on a number of key policies, 
including major public investment in infrastructure; import tariffs, licenses, and quotas to 
buffer domestic firms and enhance their technological capabilities; exchange rate 
controls, and direct government investment in key sectors (Fernández 2000). Through 
this process, Mexico attempted to create “national leaders” in the form of key state 
owned enterprises (SOEs) in the petroleum, steel and other industries. These sectors were 
linked to chemical, machinery, transport and textiles industries that also received 
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government patronage (Baer 1971; Amsden 2000). Indeed, in the first decades after 
World War II, these sectors received over sixty percent of all investment, public and 
private (Aguayo Ayala 2000). 
 
 In addition to SOEs and state patronized private industries, Mexico established 
export-processing zones called maquiladoras in the mid-1960s. Maquiladoras are “in-
bond” assembly factories where imports of unfinished goods enter Mexico duty-free 
provided that the importer posts a bond guaranteeing the export of the finished good. 
Many maquiladoras are located in the U.S.-Mexico border region and include electronics 
and non-electrical machinery, much of the automotive industry, and apparel. The SOEs, 
state patronized private enterprises, and maquiladoras supplied growing internal and 
external markets for their production.  
 
From the beginning of World War II until the early 1980s, this strategy had mixed 
results well in Mexico. In terms of income growth, this period is often referred to as 
Mexico's "Golden Age." During this time the economy grew at an annual rate of over 6 
percent, or over 3 percent in per capita terms (Cypher 1990).  What’s more, public 
investment appeared to crowd-in private investment.  According to one study examining 
the period 1950 to 1990, for every ten percent increase in public investment there was a 
corresponding bump in gross private capital formation of 2-3 percent (Ramírez 1994).  
 
To some extent, policies geared toward buttressing domestic firms from foreign 
competition resulted in the learning of complex manufacturing capabilities and the 
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creation of some industries and firms that still exist today.  However, the policies were 
not geared toward the penetration of foreign markets and therefore the learning that was 
occurring in the country was not at the technological frontier and could not benefit from a 
process of learning by competing.  Finally, the protective support for industrial learning 
was not given a well-defined end date and therefore did not provide the incentive for 
firms to get ready to compete in global markets (Fernández 2000).  The results were 
therefore uneven, as we will see in Figure 1. 
 
Market-led Industrialization 
During late 1970s-early 1980s, much of the industrial development strategy was 
financed through oil revenue (or borrowing against expectations of future oil revenue), 
the Mexican government and private sector embarked upon a period of virtually 
gluttonous borrowing and public spending. The borrowing binge, coupled with a fixed 
nominal exchange rate, generated a large external debt,  as well as rising inflation, 
growing real exchange rate appreciation, and renewed current account deficits (Kehoe 
1995). From 1970 to the early 1980s, Mexico’s foreign debt rose from $3.2 billion to 
more than $100 billion (Otero 1996). When oil prices suddenly dropped in 1982, a time 
of high world interest rates, Mexico announced that it was unable to meet its debt 
obligations—a “watershed event” for most developing countries (Rodrik 1999). A major 
devaluation plunged Mexico into economic crisis. 
 
In response to the crisis, Mexico abandoned its state-led industrialization strategy 
for a market-led one.  Influenced by international institutions and a rising level of 
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domestic constituents frustrated with past policy, in response to this crisis Mexico 
completely re-oriented its development strategy after 1982 crisis.  The most decisive 
changes came under President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988 to 1994).  Salinas 
articulated three over-arching goals: 1) achieve macroeconomic stability, 2) increase 
foreign investment, and 3) modernize the economy (Lustig 1998). As in the past, the 
heart of the plan lay in the manufacturing sector. By opening the economy and reducing 
the role of the state in economic affairs, Mexico hoped to build a strong and 
internationally competitive manufacturing sector.  
 
Meeting these goals required a top-to-bottom revamping of Mexico’s foreign and 
domestic economic policies. From 1985 to the present Mexico has signed over 25 trade 
or investment deals, with the NAFTA as the capstone (Wise 1998).  To make investments 
less cumbersome for foreign firms, Mexico also reformed its technology transfer 
requirements. During the ISI period, Mexico’s “Technology Transfer Law,” was geared 
toward strengthening the bargaining positions of the recipients of foreign technology. All 
technology transfers had to be approved by the Ministry of Trade and Industrial 
Promotion, which monitored the extent to which technology transfer could be 
assimilated, generated employment, promoted research and development, increased 
energy efficiency, controlled pollution, and enhanced local spillovers. In 1990, this was 
dismantled with a new technology transfer law relinquishing all government interference 
in the technology process to the parties involved in FDI. Government-enforced conditions 
on technology transfer were phased out, and technology agreements no longer needed 
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government approval (but must be registered). Moreover, the law now contains strict 
confidentiality clauses (UNCTC 1992). 
 
These trade and investment policies set the stage for FDI in the manufacturing 
sector to be the engine of Mexican development. There were also changes in domestic 
policies in order to align the manufacturing sector with the new, neo-liberal 
macroeconomic, trade, and investment policies. In a marked split from the past, Mexico’s 
overarching approach to industrial policy took a “horizontal” approach. Rather than 
targeting a handful of firms and industries as it had done under ISI, the state was to treat 
all firms and sectors equally without preference or subsidy. In a horizontal fashion, the 
state liberalized imports along with exports, phased out subsidies and price controls, and 
privatized all but a handful of SOEs (Dussel Peters 1999, 2003).  
 
Performance of the new strategy 
The performance of industrial development in Mexico has been uneven, at best.  
On the positive side Mexico has diversified away from primary products, upgraded the 
sophistication of some of its manufacturing export sectors, and increased the level of 
exports and investment.  On the other hand there has been very little technological 
learning for the majority of domestic firms, nor has there been linkage between the 
maquiladora manufacturing enclaves and the rest of the economy.  What’s more, 
Mexican manufacturing has become dangerously linked the US economy where it is 
losing competitiveness to China.  
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Indeed, Mexico has transformed itself from a primary products-based to a more 
diversified economy.  In 1940, agriculture was 22 percent of total output.  By the early 
1970s, agriculture had shrunk to less than 10 and in 2005 was just 4 percent of GDP.  In 
1940 manufacturing was 17 percent of GDP then reached a peak of 26 percent in 1987 
and was 18 percent in 2005.  The services industry was 50 percent of GDP in the 1960s 
and close to 70 percent in 2005   (Reynolds 1970; World Bank 2008).  
  
There has also been significant diversity within manufacturing and industrial 
upgrading within many sectors.  Table 1 exhibits the top 10 Mexican Exports in 1980, 
1990 and 2005.  Although petroleum is the lead export in each period the composition of 
the rest of the top 10 is quite different in 2005 than in 1980.  By 2005 all of the top 10 
exports (which comprise approximately 75 percent of total exports) except petroleum are 
manufactures. 
Table 1 
Rank
1 Petroleum Petroleum Petroleum
2 Natural Gas Motor vehicles Motor vehicles
3 Fruit and Vegetables Power generating machinery Telecommunications equipment
4 Nonferrous metals Fruit and Vegetables Television receivers
5 Coffee, tea Nonferrous metals Motor vehicle parts
6 Fish Iron and steel Office machines
7 Motor vehicles Electrical machinery Electricity distribution equipment
8 textile fibers Organic chemicals Lorries
9 Inorganic chemicals Office machines Electrical machinery
10 Matalliferrous ores Miscellaneous manafuctures Electrical circuits
Source: United Nations
2005
Mexico's Top 10 Exports to the World
Product
19901980
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 The volume of trade and investment has been significant as well.  Real exports 
between 1980 and 2007 increased by a factor of ten and FDI as a percent of GDP has 
increased by a factor of 3 and is close to $20 billion each year (third only to China and 
Brazil in term of FDI inflows to developing countries) (World Bank 2008; UNCTAD 
2008). The majority of exports and FDI has been in the manufacturing sector, with 
electronics and the auto sectors as the leading sectors.  
 
 Finally, there has been some scattered use of advanced technology and 
processes within the manufacturing sector, chiefly in the maquiladoras.  Researchers 
drawing on the experiences of Delphi and General Motors, depict two other 
“generations” of maquiladoras in these firms that followed the first generation described 
above.  From 1982 until NAFTA, MNCs in the maquila industry developed a higher level 
of technological sophistication and automation, a somewhat more autonomous level of 
decision-making relative corporate headquarters, and a relative increase in the number of 
Mexicans in MNC management tiers.  In terms of work organization, the gender mix 
became a bit more balanced and work was performed in a team atmosphere rather than in 
traditional assembly.  These firms experienced a “third generation” of innovation in the 
post-NAFTA period and are characterized where clusters are formed around technical 
centers, assembly plants, suppliers of components, and suppliers of services.  There was 
also a greater level of technological development, with an increasing amount of higher 
skilled work, and engineering capabilities (Carrillo and Hualde 2002). 
 
Despite improvements in diversification, sheer volume of exports and FDI, such 
benefits have come at considerable cost. Rather than spurring technological transfer and 
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R&D activities, such transfers have shrunk considerably.  FDI has been heavily 
concentrated by industry and region, is characterized by a growing gap between 
productivity and wage growth, has limited linkages with the rest of the Mexican economy 
(Shafaeddin and Pizarro 2007; Puyana and Romero 2006; Dussel Peters 2008).   In a 
large study covering 52 Mexican industries, Romo Murillo (2002) finds that foreign 
presence is negatively correlated with backward linkages. Other econometric analyses 
that looked broadly at the effects of FDI on the Mexican economy between 1970 and 
2000 found that investment liberalization was significantly correlated with increases in 
FDI and subsequent exports, but also led to a higher incidence of imports and the 
displacement of local firms (Dussel Peters, Lara, and Gomez 2003), and crowding-out of 
domestic investment  (Agosin and Machado 2005).  
 
 Rather than increasing the amount of R&D, FDI has been negatively correlated 
with R&D.  R&D expenditures fell by the top twenty foreign firms—from 0.39 percent of 
output in 1994 to 0.07 percent in 2002 (Dussel Peters 2008).  Technological decisions for 
MNCs operating in Mexico are largely made in company headquarters far from Mexico, 
where technological developments occur and largely stay (Unger and Oloriz 2000).  A 
major assessment of FDI and R&D and innovation systems in Mexico concluded that  
 
“technological developments occur mainly in the home bases of MNCs and only a 
small portion is transferred to Mexico.  This process ensures, on the one hand, 
that Mexico participates actively in the globalization of production, and on the 
other hand, that its participation in the globalization of scientific and 
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technological activities is very poor.  As companies transfer only some of their 
R&D to Mexico…..the present concentration of corporate R&D will by and large 
lead to an even stronger international divergence of technological development.” 
(Cimoli 2000: 280). 
  
The assessment attributes the poor performance of Mexico’s FDI and trade-led learning 
strategy as due to: a very weak institution response by Mexico’s fledgling innovation 
system; low levels of interaction between manufacturing sectors and local institutions 
(finding that public sector or universities were not collaborating with firms); low levels of 
technological capacity and coordination among universities.  
 
 The assessment characterizes Mexico as having a “maquila innovation system.” 
This is a system that imports technology and equipment and hosts networking activities 
by MNCs in a manner divorced from the broader economy.  The result has been that 
knowledge and technological advances are kept in developed economies.  Imported 
inputs led to replacement of the learning capabilities that could be built in domestic 
suppliers of equipment and a virtual wipe out of many of the firms that had capabilities 
before reforms.  And, for the personnel working on the limited amounts of R&D, they are 
doing so solely within a global MNC network largely divorced from interaction with 
domestic universities and research centers (Cimoli 2000). 
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Figure 1: Mexican Technological Capabilities 
 
 
Source: (Cimoli 2000: 286) 
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 These findings are depicted in the two graphs in Figure 1.  The top graph exhibits 
production capacity, competitiveness, and sectoral linkages.  During the ISI period there 
was considerable growth in firms sectoral domestic linkages and an upward trend in the 
international competitiveness and production capacities of larger exporting firms.  During 
the transition period out of ISI the international competitiveness and production 
capacities of large firms skyrocketed while the linkages between these exporters and local 
firms began to diminish in favor of imported inputs.  In the post-NAFTA period the level 
of competitiveness and capacity reach a plateau and flatten (albeit at a high level).  
 
 Cimoli’s assessment reaches a similar conclusion in terms of technological 
capabilities, as seen in the second graph.  Here, during the ISI period there was a great 
deal of domestic firm imitation and innovation of technologies, but these capabilities 
diminished throughout the reform period as larger foreign export firms (namely 
maquiladoras) increasingly imported technology.  The imported technology did lead to an 
improvement of production processes and the product quality of exporting firms, which is 
now at the world technological frontier—albeit due to MNC decisions outside of Mexico. 
  
More recently, the gains in trade and investment flows have become jeopardized.  
Throughout this transition Mexico has become increasingly reliant on the US economy.  
By 2005, 86 percent of all Mexican exports were destined to the US and 54 percent of all 
Mexican imports were originated in the US.  Thus, when the US economy slows down 
the Mexican economy follows. 
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Perhaps of greater concern is the fact that Mexico is losing its competitive 
foothold in the US economy despite its close proximity and favorable tariff access.  Two 
separate studies examined the extent to which Mexican exports were under “threat” in the 
US economy.  Threat was defined as whether a sector was losing market share in the US 
while China was gaining or gaining market share in the US while China gains faster.  In 
2005, more than 53 percent of all Mexican exports are under some kind of threat and 97 
percent of all Mexico’s high technology exports (representing 24 percent of all Mexican 
exports) were under threat (Gallagher, Moreno-Brid, and Porzecanski 2008; Gallagher 
and Porzecanski 2008).  Indeed, many MNCs are now moving from Mexico to China.  A 
recent study shows that Mexico has now become “proximity dependent.”  In other words, 
Mexico is not attracting any new foreign investment in sectors or regions that are not 
strategic for re-export to the United States (Sargent and Matthews 2007, 2008).  
 
Case in Point: High Tech Exports 
 
Mexico’s FDI-led industrial development strategy is epitomized in the high 
technology electronics sector. Built-up during the ISI period, Mexican electronic firms 
were virtually eliminated after trade liberalization and replaced by a foreign enclave 
economy with little linkages, R&D, or partnerships with universities beyond process 
innovation.  Now, those foreign firms are struggling to compete with China’s capabilities, 
even in the US market. 
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Mexican endogenous capacities for high tech manufacturing were seeded and 
cultivated by ISI policies from the 1940s to the 1980s. Mexico’s larger size allowed it to 
promote the development of domestic IT sector during the ISI period, a sector that 
became relatively vibrant by the 1980s.  Mexico’s high-tech antecedents date as far back 
as the 1940s, when – under ISI protection - national companies began to manufacture 
radios and radio components.  From the 1950s until 1980 Mexican firms manufactured 
televisions and related parts as well.  The government targeted the computer industry in 
the late 1970s as part of the strategy of the National Council on Science and Technology 
(CONACYT) to increase Mexico’s national self-sufficiency in technology. CONACYT 
established the PC Programme (Programa de Computadoras) to develop a domestic 
computer industry (supported by the surrounding electronics industry) that could not only 
serve the domestic market but also emerge as a key exporter for Mexico.   
 
MNCs were limited to 49 percent foreign ownership of firms in the sector.  They 
had to invest between three and six percent of gross sales into R&D and create research 
centres and training programmes.  And domestic parts and components had to account for 
at least 45 percent of value added for personal computers and 35 percent for mini-
computers.  New Mexican-owned firms could receive fiscal credits and low interest loans 
from government development banks.  In search of domestic markets and export 
platforms, the foreign firms that came were IBM, Hewlett Packard, Digital, NCR, 
Tandem and Wang.  IBM and Hewlett Packard were the leaders and accounted for 63 
percent of all computer production.  The other foreign firms were responsible for 
approximately 18 percent, and wholly-owned Mexican firms made up another 18 percent.    
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The hub of high technology exports became the western state of Jalisco 
(specifically the Guadalajara city region) and other regions of the country where these 
firms became concentrated were on the US-Mexico border region (TV monitors), and 
surrounding Mexico City (electronic appliances).  Guadalajara was the ideal region for 
high-tech FDI, as it had lower wages and weak unions, proximity to the US, low tariffs, 
and five major universities and numerous technical schools and industrial parks that can 
host research activity and graduate an adequately skilled workforce (Gallagher and 
Zarsky 2007).  
 
What’s more, the government adopted a number of policies to attract MNCs to 
Mexico.  At the national level, one program (called PITEX) allows firms to import their 
inputs duty-free as long as more than 65 percent of their output is exported (Dussel Peters 
2003).  The Jalisco state government supplemented these federal programs with a 
regional plan to attract firms and suppliers.  The state’s Economic Promotion Law 
reduced or eliminated state and municipal taxes for firms that located to the region.  In 
addition, the Guadalajara branch of the national chamber of commerce for the IT 
industry, CANIETI (Camara Nacional de la Industria, Electronica, de 
Telecomunicaciones e Informatica) works to attract large MNCs to the region and puts on 
numerous trade shows and workshops on the industry.  A more regional organization 
named CADELEC (Cadena Productiva de la Electronica) was founded in 1998 with 
funding from CANIETI, the United Nations Development Programme, and two other 
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federal agencies.  CADELEC’s mission is to match suppliers with the large MNCs 
(CADELEC 2004; Palacios 2001).  
 
The laissez-faire strategy was a success—at least in terms of attracting investment 
and increasing exports. Between 1994 and 2000, foreign direct investment in the 
electronics sector grew by five times and the value of exports quadrupled.   At their 
peaks, exports from Mexico’s electronics sector totaled $46 billion in 2000, and FDI 
inflows totaled $1.5 billion in 1999.   
 
By 2000, IT was a key component of the Mexican manufacturing economy, 
accounting for nearly 6 percent of manufacturing output, 27 percent of all exports, 9 
percent of employment, and 10 percent of FDI.  Electronics are Mexico’s largest 
manufactures export, and are second only to autos in terms of manufacturing GDP and 
employment (Dussel Peters, Lara, and Gomez 2003). 
 
Fuelled by large FDI inflows, Mexico’s IT industry became increasingly 
competitive during the second half of the 1990s.  Mexico’s share of  world IT exports 
ballooned from eight-tenths of one percent in 1985 to three percent in 2000 (Dussel 
Peters, Lara, and Gomez 2003). By 2001, Mexico was the 11th largest exporter of IT 
products in the world economy. However, as shown in Figure 2, Mexico’s 
competitiveness and concentration in high tech exports began to flatten then decline, 
particularly when compared to China’s. 
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Figure 2. 
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  Source: (World Bank 2008) 
 
Evolution of domestic firms 
Unlike China, rapid MNC-led growth came at the expense of Mexico’s domestic 
IT firms, which were virtually wiped out.   The domestic high tech industry is nearly 
extinct, and few domestic input producers have become integrated into the global 
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production chains of the IT MNCs operating in Mexico. Between 1985 and 1997, the 
number of indigenous electronics firms in Guadalajara declined by 71 percent (Rivera 
Vargas, 2002).  As shown in Table 2., 13 of the 25 indigenous electronics firms that were 
still in existence at the end of 1997 had been closed by 2005 (Gallagher and Zarsky 2007; 
Sargent and Matthews 2007, 2008)  Indeed, signs were already evident as early as 1998, 
when the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean concluded that 
industrialization in the electronics industry had become almost completely 
“internationalized” and was beginning to resemble a “parallel economy” that had very 
few linkages in Mexico (ECLAC 1999). Since then, the literature has been quite 
extensive and too large to cover in this paper, but key contributions are two large edited 
books by Enrique Dussel Peters (Dussel Peters 2003, 2004), and a volume by Rivera 
Vargas (2002).   
 
Table 2 
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Firm Ownership (percent)
Cumex Electronics 50/50 Mex-US CM of PCBs
Mitel 51/49 Mex-Canada Telephone Components
Phoenix International 50/50 Mex-US Plastic Injection
Encitel 100 Mex CM of PCBs
Info Spacio 100 Mex CM of printers
Logix Computers 100 Mex Design and manufacturer of PCs
Mexel 100 Mex CM of PCBs
Unisys 100 Mex CM of computers and peripherals
Electron 100 Mex Design and manufacturer of PCs
Scale Computers 100 Mex Design and manufacturer of PCs
Advanced Electronics 100 Mex Design and Manufacturer of PCBs
Compuworld 100 Mex CM of hard drives
Microtron 100 Mex Buffers and Carton Packages
Source:  Woo (2001); Rivera Vargas (2002); author interviews
IT Plant Closings--Whole or Partly Owned Mexican Firms
Activity
 
(Rivera Vargas 2002; Woo 2001) 
 
The linkages between foreign high tech firms and national firms is even more 
dismal than the national average.  Most of the MNCs are working with local firms that 
supply cardboard boxes, shipping labels, cables, wires, and disposal services.  This 
finding suggests that although the share of national inputs has increased - though it still 
remains very small (at less than 2 percent of all inputs) and the composition of those 
inputs has changed from national high-tech firms to national shipping and disposal firms 
(Gallagher and Zarsky 2007). 
 
 
Table 3 
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Computers Peripherals Telecom
China
2000 Market Share 6.0 4.0 5.7
2005 Market Share 28.8 15.7 18.3
Percentage Point Change 22.8 11.7 12.6
Mexico
2000 Market Share 4.5 2.2 5.2
2005 Market Share 3.5 1.2 3.5
Percentage Point Change -1.0 -1.0 -1.7
(country exports as a percent of world exports)
China vs. Mexico in World IT Markets
 
 
 Table 3 compares Mexico and China in world high technology markets.  In 
2000—the year before China entered into the WTO—Mexico and China enjoyed global 
market penetration in computers, peripherals, and telecommications at similar orders of 
magnitude.  In just five y ears China captured 15-29 percent of global high tech markets 
whereas Mexico lost competiveness in each case (Gallagher and Zarsky 2007).   
 
In response to competitive pressure MNCs in Mexico have been upgrading their 
product mix.  For the most part, they have been able to redirect their generic 
manufacturing capacities to other products and clients.   Jabil Circuit, for instance, shifted 
production to communications switches, specialized hand-held credit card processing 
machines, Internet firewalls, and electronic controls for washing machines.  Solectron is 
assembling components for mainframes and AX-400 conductivity transmitters.  SCI-
Sanmina now assembles MRI scanners for Phillips and electronics auto components for 
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Ford and GM.  Not all of the MNCs were able to upgrade with this agility, and even in 
such a ramp up national firms continued to be out in the cold.  Indeed, most of the CMs 
have resorted to internet based open supplier bidding and the winners are other foreign 
firms (Gallagher and Zarsky 2007; Sargent and Matthews 2007, 2008). Mexico is also 
loosing grounds to China in “non-proximity [to USA market] dependent ,technology 
intensive EPZ manufactures” (Sargent and Matthews 2008).  
 
 In short, during in the 1990s Mexico was a poster child for neo-liberalism, 
throwing open its borders to trade and foreign investment, embracing NAFTA, and 
ending the government’s role in fostering industrial learning. The evidence shows that 
although Mexico was initially successful in attracting multinational corporations, foreign 
investments waned in the absence of active government support and as China became 
increasingly competitive. Moreover, the FDI-led innovation and growth strategy created 
an "enclave economy" the benefits of which were confined to an international sector not 
connected to the wider Mexican economy. In fact, MNCs put many domestic firms out of 
business and transferred only limited amounts of technology.  The prevailing consensus 
that Mexico’s development model has not performed well should not be interpreted as an 
argument for returning to the ISI policies of the past.  As shown in Figure 1, even during 
the ISI period Mexico’s level of competitiveness, product sophistication, and production 
capacities we relatively weak.  By the end of the ISI period even the domestic imitation 
capabilities and  the domestic linkages started to cascade as well.  Indeed, it is clear that 
the goal of integrating with the world economy was a good one.  The problem has been 
that Mexico’s hands off approach centered on thinking the market would automatically 
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allocate such capabilities.  As we will now see, China has similar goals but followed a 
different path to achieve them. 
 
 
III.  Crossing the River by Touching Each Stone: Technological  Learning in China 
 
Like Mexico, China embarked on a process of economic reform over a quarter of 
century ago. Like Mexico, it has sought to attract FDI into manufacturing and high 
technology sectors in order to gain access to technology and marketing channels for 
exports. Nevertheless, China’s industrial development is very different from Mexico’s in 
two important ways. First, in contrast to Mexico’s rapid opening of markets and 
integration into the world economy, China has taken a more gradual and experimental 
approach to integration, upgrading, and industrial development.  Secondly, alongside 
reforms China continued a parallel set of targeted government policies to support and 
nurture industrial development. Its nurturing of industrial development has been geared 
toward learning through R&D and training for development of capabilities of domestic 
firms for increasing value added in exports.  
 
From Mao to the Market: economic reform in context 
 
In a somewhat similar fashion to Mexico, China underwent a period of state-led 
industrialization from late 1940s until 1978.  This period has been referred to as the 
period of “Big Push Industrialization”.  As in Mexico, during the Big Push the goal of the 
Government was toward rapid industrialization through import substitution.  The basic 
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strategy was to invest in the strategic industries identified by government decision-
makers. The industries selected included those with the largest potential for backward 
linkages.  Integration with the global economy was extraordinarily low (Naugthon 2007). 
 
 Eighty percent of the targeted industries were “heavy” industries, such as steel, 
which were linked with coal, iron ore, machinery and other sectors.  A number of other 
industries such as chemical fertilizers, motor vehicles, and electric generating equipment 
were also among those created by the government.  Almost all of these industries became 
dominated by State Owned Enterprise (SOEs) and the planners assigned them production 
targets and prices. The government also allocated labor force to industrial firms.  
Through one lens this effort was successful as the industrial base of the country was 
created.  From 1952 to 1978 industrial output grew at an annual rate of 11.5 percent and 
the share of industrial sector in GDP increased from 14 to 44 percent and the share of 
agriculture fell from 51 to 28 percent (Naugthon 2007). In order to learn technology, 
reverse engineering was an important ingredient of technological development.  
 
 On the other hand, these policies involved some shortcomings.  First and foremost 
the focus on industrialization neglected growth of household consumption and the 
development of the countryside.  Whereas capital formation grew at more than 10 percent 
per year from 1952 to 1978, private consumption grew only 4.3 annually. Employment 
generation was also low given the capital intensive nature of the main targeted industries.  
Perhaps the most grave was the technological capabilities of the targeted firms. Further, 
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the human capital formation did not expand enough for these sectors to become efficient 
and competitive internationally (Naugthon 2007). 
 
 Chinese economic reforms started in 1978, two years after the death of Mao 
Zedong. In this year, China embarked on a programme of economic reform aiming at 
strategic integration into the world economy by following a “dual track” policy of 
liberalizing FDI and inflow of imported inputs to selected industries while buttressing 
those sectors to the point of maturity and nurturing other sectors until they were ready to 
face competition with imports. Since then, according to the literature, the China’s 
industrial strategy has been three-pronged.  First, government policy aimed at creating 
endogenous productive capacity, in the form of targeting specific industries through state 
ownership (SOEs) or government support, paying increasing attention to science and 
technology policy, and linking the SOEs with the private sector and research institutes. 
Secondly and very importantly, Chinese support for domestic industry has always had an 
eye on outside of China.  In order to gain technology, finance, and access to world 
markets China has also gradually and strategically integrated into world markets.  
 
 Thirdly, in undertaking economic reform, China’s new leaders followed an 
experimental approach.  Unlike Mexico, there was a much more experimental (trial and 
error) and less certain attitude toward reform. The Mexican Government was 
ideologically committed to reform towards a market economy and free trade. In a sense, 
free trade and a market based economy was an end by itself in the case of Mexico, and it 
was taken for granted that such a transition by itself would enhance learning through 
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trade and lead to deepening of industrialization and promoting growth. By contrast, 
Chinese policy was based on the use of market and trade as a means to development. 
Hence, in the eyes of Chinese policy makers, market and government policies were to 
supplement each other while the weight of each would change as the economy would 
develop. 
 
“It was never conceivable to Chinese policy-makers that their economy would 
postpone economic development until after an interlude of system transformation.  
It was always assumed that system transformation would have to take place 
concurrently with economic development, and indeed that the process of 
economic development would drive market transition forward and guarantee its 
eventual success.  Individual reform policies were frequently judged on the basis 
of their contribution to economic growth (rather than to transition as such). In the 
beginning the approach was followed because reformers literally did not know 
where they were going: they were reforming “without a blueprint” and merely 
seeking ways to ameliorate the obvious serious problems of the planned economy.  
But even after the goal of a market economy gradually gained ascendance in the 
minds of reformers, it was not anticipated that market transition would be 
completed until the economy reached at least middle-income status.  And in fact, 
that is exactly what eventually happened.” (Naugthon 2007: 86). 
 
Deng Xiaoping referred to this strategy as “crossing the river by feeling each stone,” 
(Naugthon 2007).  This approach stands in stark contrast to the Washington Consensus 
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approach adopted in Latin America and Mexico and that advocated for swift “shock” 
transitions to a market economy (Williamson 1990). 
 
 China’s gradual and experimental approach to reform allowed for the 
development of domestic firms and industries before liberalizing fully. More 
importantly,it also allowed the potential “losers” from liberalization to be less numerous 
(Naugthon 2007). The dual track had the coexistence of market and planned economies at 
the same time, referred to socialist market economy in the literature (see, for example, 
Singh 1993).  
 
The role of R&D 
Unlike Mexico, where it was assumed that technology would be transferred 
through trade and FDI, conscious attention to science and technology (S&T) policy and 
research and development (R&D) has been a cornerstone of China’s industrial 
development and integration to the world economy. The Chinese government learned in 
practice that technology acquisition from abroad through MNCs alone will not 
necessarily lead to transfer and development of technology; there was a need for 
increasing the absorptive capacity of domestic firms and the development of indigenous 
technological capacity building. The ingredients of the government strategy included 
government support, indigenous R&D and innovation investment within individual firms, 
and creation of R&D institutions. It also included alliance among firms in an industry and 
their cooperation with research institutes, universities as well as foreign firms, targeting, 
in particular, the strategic industries . 
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Government policy ranged from direct investment, provision of guidance, 
institutional and financial support, creating favourable environment for innovation as 
well as introduction of competition into the domestic market for the strategic industries 
(e.g. telecommunication) (Fan, Gao, and Watanabe 2007: 359) and development of 
national standards and patents for main IT products (Wang and Wang 2007). The S&T 
strategy of the Government also aimed at a long-term goal of upgrading the industrial 
base of the country and it was selective, targeted and responsive to the market dynamic 
with growing emphasize on the private sector (including MNCs). Beginning in the early 
1980s China put in place a number of policies that not only aimed at conducting basic 
research but that also put equal emphasis on the deployment and diffusion of technology 
as well.  Table 4 provides a snapshot of China’s key S&T policies between 1982 and 
2000 (see also the case of Mobile communication industry and high-definition disc player 
industry below).   
 
Table 4 
Policy Dominant Feature Year
Key technology R&D program  Encouraging efforts in key technologies 1982
Resolution on the reform of S&T system (CCCP) Adopting flexible system on R&D management 1985
Sparkle system 5 Promoting basic research in agriculture 1 1985
863 program High-tech promotion 1986
Torch program High-tech commercialisation, high-tech zones 1988
National S&T achievements spreading program Promoting product commercialisation 1990
National engineering technology research centre program Technology transfer and commercialisation of research 1991
Climbing program Promoting basic research 1992
Endorsement of UAEs by SSTCC Promoting university and industry linkage 1992
S&T progress law Technology transfer, S&T system reform 1993
Decision on accelerating S&T progress (CCCP) Promoting URI-industry linkage 1995
Law for promoting commercialisation of S&T achievement Regulating the commercialisation of S&T achievement 1996
Super 863 program Commercialisation, break-through in key areas 1996
Decision on developing high-tech industrialization Encouraging technology innovation and commercialisation 1999
Guidelines for developing national university science parks Accelerating the development of university science parks 2000
Source: (Xiwei and Xiandong, 2007)
Development of China's National Innovation System
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 (Xiwei and Xiangdong 2007) 
 The government apparatus for guiding the S&T consisted of six different entities, 
Chinese academy of Science together with 5 relevant Ministries, including the Ministry 
of Information Technology which was specifically created for supporting IT industries 
(Xiwei and Xiangdong 2007: 318). The national system of innovation was geared to basic 
research as well as R&D in selective activities. The 863 Programme (1986) aimed at high 
basic and applied research in seven areas and 15 topics with the cooperation of private 
enterprises. The seven areas included, in order of priority given by the planners, 
information technology, laser, automation, biotechnology, new material technology, 
astro-technology and energy technology (Fan and Watanabe 2006: 311). The “climbing 
programme” of 1992 was oriented towards acceleration of basic research. By contrast, the 
Torch programme was market-oriented right from its inception in 1988 and was geared 
mainly to commercialization of results of R&D. Its objectives ranged from providing 
enabling environment for high-tech industries, to creation of high-tech zones, executing 
projects in aforementioned selected (7) areas, training and facilitating international 
cooperation (Fan and Watanabe 2006: 312). In 1995 the government passed the 
“Decision on Accelerating Scientific and Technological Progress” in order to intensify 
the technological development (Walsh 2003: 105). 
 
 The ninth 5 year plan (1996-2000), specifically emphasized the the development 
of capabilities to increase domestic value added in assembly operations in computer 
industry and its peripherals. This was followed by the emphasize on innovation in 
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integrated circuits and software technology in the tenth 5 year plan (2001-5) under so-
called “Golden Projects”  (Xiwei and Xiangdong 2007: 321). 
 
 The national system of innovation (NIS) was dynamic in terms of both 
institutional development and the change in the relative role of Government and private 
enterprises. The S&T system of China consisted of universities, research institutes and 
public and private enterprises-including foreign firms. The interrelationship between 
universities/research institutes and industry is regarded unique (Chen and Kenney 2008) 
Furthermore, the system went through continuous reforms in terms of policies and the 
involvement of actors in R&D. To benefit from “collective efficiency” through 
clustering, a number of high-tech zones (technology parks) were established (by 1992, 52 
high-tech zones had been established (Xiwei and Xiangdong 2007: 319)5.  
 
 Close links were also developed among enterprises, universities, and research 
institutes. Further, commercialization of R&D was encouraged. In particular, over time 
the role of private enterprises in R&D increased significantly. Table 5 shows the 
evolution of R&D in China from 1987 to 2003 where the number of R&D institutes 
increased by 67 percent. By 2003, however, the number of public institutes decreased 
while the private sector (enterprise) led institutes more than doubled. This trend is 
mimicked in terms of spending.  In 1987, 60.7 percent of R&D expenditure was 
undertaken by public institutes, by 2003, the share of private sector was 62.4 percent and 
that of research institutes and universities was 36 per cent (table 5).  The distinction 
between private and public entities involved in R&D is however blurred; some 
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universities and research institutes own enterprises engaged in research (Chen and 
Kenney 2008).  
 
 Expenditure and policy has not been horizontal, but has been targeted to specific 
sectors and industries outlined above.  In allocating R&D expenditures China has 
targeted a handful of sectors in electronics, semiconductor, and automotive to eventually 
serve as “national champions” (Xiwei and Xiangdong 2007).  
Table 5 
Number of R&D Institutes R&D Expenditure 
(in 100 million yuan, %)
1987 2003 1987 2003
Public Research Institutes 5,222 4,169 106.8 (60.7) 399 (25.9)
University R&D Units 934 3,200 7(4) 162.3(10.5)
Enterprise R&D Units 5,021 11,300 62.1(35.3) 960.2(62.4)
1521.5
Total 11,177 18,669 175.9(100) 1521.5(100)
Source: (Xiwei and Xiandong, 2007)
Evolution of R&D in China, 1987 to 2003
 
(Xiwei and Xiangdong 2007) 
 The comparison of China and Mexico is striking both in terms of input to and the 
results of the S&T policies. Table 6 compares China with Mexico and a number of 
developing and developed countries in terms of expenditures on R&D. China’s 
expenditure on R&D (as a percentage of  GDP and in per capita) far exceed that of 
Mexico in term of both level and change over time. In fact, the difference in the 
performance of the two countries becomes more revealing when one compares the 
growth rates of expenditures in absolute terms. Over 1996-2004 Mexico’s expenditure (in 
 38 
terms of US$ and PPP) doubled and China’s increased by a factor of five. China’s 
indicators for R&D are the highest in Asia after Singapore, Rep. of Korea and Taiwan; it 
is also higher than Spain and Italy. The number of people working on R&D in China 
were over 1.15 million (table 7), or 13.4.per 1000 of population, in China in 2004 as 
compared with 60039 (0.59 per 1000 of population) in the case of Mexico in 2003 (as 
table 6 and UNCTAD, 2007). In 2003 there were 17.1 research institutes per million of 
population in China. Research was also geared to applied and experimental issues (Table 
8) in order to be able to concentrate on practical issues for development of domestic 
value added in export products.  
 
 Another difference between the two countries is the change in the role played by 
private enterprises in R&D. The relatively hands-off approach deployed by Mexican 
government on activities of the private firms did not motivate them to increase their 
involvement in R&D as much as China, where the government provided guidance and 
support. According to data provided by UNESCO, the share of business enterprises in 
gross domestic expenditure on R&D increase from 22.4% in 1996 to 31.7% in 2004 in 
the case of Mexico. 
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Table 6: Expenditure on Research and development in a selected  developing and developed countries*
Countries Year Share in GDP Per capita 
Asian developing countries and Mexico
Rep. of Korea 2005 2.99 666.3
Taiwan province of China n.a n.a
Singapore 2005 2.36 702.2
China:
1996 0.57 15.7
2005 1.34 89.6
Hong Kong SAR 2004 0.74 231.3
Malaysia 2004 0.63 64.6
India 2005 0.61 20.8
Pakistan 2005 0.43 10.1
Mexico:
1996 0.31 22.4
2004 0.41 40.4
Thailand 2004 0.25 29.7
Vietnam 2002 0.19 4.5
Sri Lanka 2004 0.19 7.4
Philippines 2003 0.14 6.2
Indonesia** 2005 0.05 1.4
Developed countries:
Israel 2005 4.95 1317.4
Japan 2004 3.18 440.1
Switzerland 2004 2.94 1024.4
United State 2004 2.68 1058
Germany 2005 2.51 736
France 2005 2.13 650.8
Australia 2004 1.77 541.5
United Kingdom 2004 1.75 560
Belgium 2005 1.82 588
Spain 2005 1.12 305.8
Italy 2005 1.1 307.3
-----
Sources : UNESCO: Online database on Expenditures on R&D
*. GDP and per capita GDP are in PPP
**. Partial data
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No. % No. %
Government 232 000 29 243702 21
Business 376 700 46 696 840 60
Higher education 148100 18 212075 18
Others 47200 7 - -
Total 804 000 100 1152617 100
1996 2004
Table 7: Number of personnel engaged R&D in China (1996-2004)
Source: Based on UNESCO, Statistics of Science and Technology online
 
 
No. (1000) % No (1000) %
Basic research 522 5 1310 5.3
Applied research 1759 16.8 4330 17.7
Experimental 8143 78.1 18850 76.9
Total 10425 100 24500 100
Table 8:   Expenditure on R&D (10 million Yuan)
2001 2005
 
Source: (People's Republic of China 2006: Table 21-38)  
 
By contrast, the corresponding figures for China increased from 43.3% to 68.3% (Xiwei 
and Xiangdong 2007)6. Similarly, their contribution to the sources of R&D funding of 
China increased from 18% in 1985 to 32.4% in 1994 and 60.2% in 2003 (Xiwei and 
Xiangdong 2007). In other words, unlike the case of Mexico, private enterprises have 
become the driving forces in R&D activities where 7 firms were main actors involved in 
targeted technology areas7. 
 
 The results of the implementation of S&T policy are striking for China as 
compared with Mexico. Table 9 shows that on average, more patents are filed in China 
each year than all the LA countries combined, let alone Mexico.  What’s more, whereas 
in LAC only 13 percent of all patents are by residents, in China that figure is over 75 
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percent. Similar results are also evident in terms of the number of articles published by 
Chinese scholars as compared with those of Latin American. 
 
 Moreover, the relative importance of inventions in granted patent has increased 
sharply over time (table 10). It is true that the share of domestic firms in total patents and 
in patents granted for invention has decreased since the accession to WTO in 2000 (Table 
A.1 and 10) because of the increasing involvement of increased involvement of foreign 
companies. Nevertheless, the number of invention patents granted to domestic firms has 
accelerated sharply during 2000-2005. The annual average growth rate of invention 
patents granted to domestic firms was 27.3 per cent during 2005 as compared with 18.3 
per cent during 1990-2000 (based on table A.1). As a result, the share of invention in 
total patents granted to domestic firms has almost doubled in 2005 as compared with 
2000 (Table 9.a).  
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Table 9 
1980 - 2005 2000 - 2005
East Asia and Pacific
Patent applications, nonresidents 27,119 64,235
Patent applications, residents 17,387 44,106
Patent applications, resident share 64.12% 68.66%
Research and development expenditure (% of GDP) 0.89 1.09
Scientific and technical journal articles 11,505 24,804
China 
Patent applications, nonresidents 24,236 58,876
Patent applications, residents 18,785 43,509
Patent applications, resident share 77.51% 73.90%
Research and development expenditure (% of GDP) 0.98 1.21
Scientific and technical journal articles 10,386 22,979
Latin America and the Caribbean
Patent applications, nonresidents 19,044 29,850
Patent applications, residents 3,792 4,056
Patent applications, resident share 19.91% 13.59%
Research and development expenditure (% of GDP) 0.57 0.57
Scientific and technical journal articles 9,666 16,472
Mexico
Patent applications, nonresidents 7,051 12,745
Patent applications, residents 540 498
Patent applications, resident share 7.65% 3.91%
Research and development expenditure (% of GDP) 0.39 0.41
Scientific and technical journal articles 2,026 3,488
Selected Science and Technology Indicators
 
Source: (World Bank 2008) 
 
Table 10: The share of invention in grated patents (1990-2005) 
 
 1990 2000 2005 
Share of invention in total granted patent  16.9 12 24.9 
Share of domestic invention in total invention  29.9 48.7 38.8 
Share of invention in total domestic patent 5.9 6.5 12.1 
Source: Based on table A.1 
 
 
Training 
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In tandem with R&D, China has a high level of support for tertiary education and 
training. Over 20,000 scientists and engineers graduate from Chinese universities per 
year (MOST 2006).  The high level of education in science and technology as well as the 
facilities for vocational education facilitate training of skilled manpower for 
technological development. In 2005, the number of graduates in the fields of science and 
technology from universities and junior colleges was 1,256,000, or over 1000 per million 
of the population. In the same year the corresponding number of graduates from 
postgraduate courses was 95000, or over 90 per million.8  Continuous attention to 
education was a characteristic of Chinese overall development strategy before as well as 
following the reform period. According to the World Bank, government expenditure on 
tertiary education per student was 90 percent of GDP per capita in 1999 (in Mexico that 
figure was 48 percent) (World Bank 2008).   
 
 Comprehensive information on the training programme of the Government is 
lacking. Nevertheless, there are indications that the Government focussed on enhancing 
the high-tech skills and education by establishing state funding training centres (Walsh 
2003: 71). Some universities were also involved in training and a number of them 
befitted from partnership with MNCs for training in addition to R&D (Walsh 2003: 83). 
The Beijing University of Post and Communication is one example of cooperation with 
MNCs in training. Foreign investors also provide some training of local staff 
independently (Walsh 2003: 96).  
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Vocational schools (1000) Students abroad
1978 79 9
1990 893 35440
2000 1763 56767
2005 1700 189728
Table 11: The number of graduates in vocational secondary 
schools and the number of students studying abroad (1978-
2005)
 
Sources: (People's Republic of China 2006: Table 2-10) 
 
 The government created a large number of vocational schools. In 2005 there were 
198 566 vocational school in China out of which 11 611 were secondary schools and 
4230 were technical training. The number of graduates for vocational secondary schools 
jumped over 21 times between 1978 and 2005 (table 11). Further, the government policy 
to send students abroad helped the development of domestic skills in research and 
development even though some of them never returned to China. The combination of 
these factors allowed rapid expansion of persons engaged in scientific and technical 
activities in more recent years; it increase by over 21 per cent during 2001-05 reaching 3 
810 000 (Ibid. Table 21-36). One shortcoming is the lack of upper management staff 
despite the fact that some Chinese who have studied and have experience abroad have 
returned.  
 
 
Other measures to build-up capabilities of national enterprises 
 
In contrast to Mexico, the main motive behind development of capabilities of domestic 
firms was the realization by the government and national enterprises that the transfer of 
technology from MNCs was not easily possible (Fan, Gao, and Watanabe 2007: 360). 
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Under the joint ventures there was a limit to transfer of technology to Chinese partners 
(Walsh 2003: 113). The effort to develop capabilities of domestic firms in turn simulated 
the rivalry among MNCs to be involved in R&D programmes of domestic firms in order 
not to miss the large Chinese market.  
 
 The Chinese Government has followed a gradual and dual policy in developing 
the capabilities of domestic enterprises. It has gradually increased the role of private 
forms in the process of industrialization and export expansion. For example, the share of 
private enterprises in exports has increased 18 percent in 1985 and 60 percent in 2005 
(Naugthon 2007).  At the same time it has implicitly, or explicitly, established a division 
of labour between SOEs and private enterprises. The private enterprises have 
emphasized, as expected, short-term opportunities and low-cost production and sale to 
achieve high profitability. By contrast, SOEs' concentrated on long-term goals through 
investment for development of new products9 rather than profitability per se Li and 
(Xia,2008). In their efforts, SOEs benefited little from spill -over effects of MNCs 
(Girma and Gong, 2008). SOEs were privileged to have better access to government 
funds and loans from the banking system (Li and Xia,I Ibid)  
 
 In their applied R&D, SOEs benefited from a programme called “National 
Science and Technology Diffusion” which was specifically designed for, and devoted to 
them. This strategy is criticized not to have market oriented goals in the case of SOEs. It 
has been, however, plausible, in our view, to reform SOEs gradually in order not to let 
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the long-term objectives of the Government be undermined, particularly that they had had 
social objectives and responsibilities in addition to their long-term technological goals.  
 
To provide sources of investment for domestic firms, China established two 
funds: the Export Development Fund for the larger firms and the Fund for Small and 
Medium Enterprise Incursions into International Markets for suppliers. The Government 
also offered value-added tax refunds to exporting firms, and the Chinese Export-Import 
Bank also provided loans at preferential interest rates.  
 
 Chinese domestic firms enjoyed the advantage of familiarity with the domestic 
market as well as allocation of significant part of the domestic market to them by the 
government (e.g. in the telecom equipment industries) (Fan, Gao, and Watanabe 2007: 
358). Yet, the new comer local firms of China, like enterprises in other developing 
countries, suffered from two main disadvantages, as compared with MNCs, in 
development of capabilities for and commercialization of new technology: resource 
disadvantages and reputation disadvantages particularly in the IT sector where the 
technology is complicated and changes rapidly (Gao et al. 2007). Provided with 
incentives as well as support by the Government together with some capabilities 
developed during the import substitution period, however, a number of firms have 
managed to break into the market by developing frontier technologies (see below). In 
addition to the support from the Government, the leading domestic firms south 
collaboration with customers and cooperation with MNCs (Gao et al. 2007).  
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The role of FDI 
The contribution of MNCs to financial resources needed for R&D has been small. 
Nevertheless, they have become increasingly involved in R&D in China. Foreign high-
tech R&D in China has gone through three phases: explanatory and strategic partnership 
(early-mid1990s), expansion (mid-late1990s) and consolidation (late 1990s.cuurent) 
(Walsh 2003: 86-91). During 1990s, foreign investment in R&D was more of a "show" 
rather than genuine activities as establishing R&D was a pre-condition for obtaining 
approval to establish joint ventures. During the second phase the MNCs also started to 
expand training centres. It was during the third phase when the MNCs became interested 
in moving up the value-added production chain to upgrade their products ;thus needed 
local R&D (Walsh 2003: 86-91) 
Meanwhile, the Chinese government also provided the MNCs “a range of 
preferential policies, including tax rebates, construction loans, access to modern facilities 
and other incentives” particularly in the case of  IT industries (Walsh 2003: xiii and 56). 
While encouraging foreign forms to undertake R&D in China, the authorities initially 
entered into partnership with a number of foreign firms to create inter-firm rivalry and 
accelerated technological development (Walsh 2003: 77-78 and 80-82). Subsequently, 
wholly foreign -owned firms established R&D facilities in the country (Walsh 2003: 79). 
Attracting multiple foreign partners was successful particularly in the IT industry. It is 
estimated that around 120 to 400 foreign R&D centres were operational in 2003 (Walsh 
2003: xiv). In the case of IT industries, since early 1990s, almost all main MNCs 
involved in this industry have established R&D centres in China. In Beijing alone they 
established 18 main centres between 1993 and 200310. Domestic firms also benefited 
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from the partnership with MNCs, to some extent. For example, Legend, Stone, founder 
and Great Wall, learned a great deal about modern manufacturing in addition to 
technology development (Walsh 2003: 79). Nevertheless, the Chinese authorities realized 
that joint ventures with MNCs alone would not be sufficient for technology transfer.  
 
Generally speaking, in China, unlike Mexico, FDI has crowded in domestic 
investment as Government efforts aimed at building capabilities of domestic firms. As 
predicted by TCB, such capabilities in turn motivated MNCs to invest in R&D. As 
domestic firms were involved in development of their technological capabilities, many 
MNCs were motivated to join them in their R&D in order to share the domestic market, 
particularly that the government also provided them with other incentives as already 
mentioned.  
In China efforts to indigenously develop technological capabilities and to bring 
such technologies to market have been coupled with a targeted but aggressive acquisition 
of foreign technologies through foreign direct investment. The strategy has been to either 
develop a sector or technology nationally, or to “import” the technology through FDI. 
Initially, licensing FDI was conditioned to arrangements for transfer of technology and 
provision of linkages to local firms, joint ventures and partnership. In 2001, such 
condition is dropped, but MNCs are encouraged to invest in R&D, particularly in 
information technology, “by offering a range of preferential policies” that includes tax 
rebates, construction loans, access to modern facilities, and other incentives” (Walsh 
2003: xiii and 56). Whereas national Mexican firms only capture approximately 5 percent 
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of the inputs of foreign firms, in China that number is well over 20 percent (Gallagher 
and Zarsky 2007).  
 
Case in Point: High Tech Industries 
 
China is the most impressive contemporary case of latecomer high technology 
development11. For twenty-five years, the country gradually and quietly built 
manufacturing capacities and integrated into world markets.  China has been at the core 
of MNC location strategies because of its multiple location specific assets:  a large and 
growing internal market and a low-cost export platform for manufactured goods.  What’s 
more, China provides a match between national linkage capability between MNCs and 
domestic suppliers. Now the country is on the verge of having formidable flagship firms 
of its own in the IT industry. 
 
 FDI in high tech of China has gone through four phases: sale, marketing, 
licensing and technical services; manufacturing and production; product design, 
localization and redevelopment and finally R&D (Walsh 2003: 75-76).  Much is made of 
China’s low wages as a major factor driving MNC outsourcing to China and IT 
development more generally. There is little doubt that wages are low: the average 
manufacturing wage in China was estimated to be 61 cents an hour in 2001, compared to 
$16.14 in the US, and $2.08 in Mexico (Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 2003).  But the 
story of China’s success and likely emergence as the center for global IT production goes 
beyond low wages and generic product manufacturing capabilities.  
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The development of the IT industry is in some part the result of government push 
and nurturing. In 1986, four Chinese scientists recommended to the Government that IT 
be designated a strategic sector.  The request was approved and in 1988, China’s National 
Development and Reform Commission (formerly the State Planning Commission) 
designated high tech as a “pillar” industry worthy of strategic industrial policy (MOST 
2006).  It was coupled with the MOST’s National High Tech R&D (or 863) Program that 
supported R&D efforts of local governments, national firms, and regions. The goal was to 
foster a vibrant high tech sector with national firms that could eventually compete as 
global flagships.  The strategy was to establish domestic firms and bring foreign firms to 
China to build their capacity to produce components and peripherals for PCs.  To this 
end, IBM, HP, Toshiba, and Compaq were all invited to come to China and form joint 
ventures with such Chinese firms as Legend, Great Wall, Trontru, and Star. China 
required the foreign firms to transfer specific technologies to the joint venture, establish 
R&D centers, source to local firms, and train Chinese employees as mentioned (USDOC 
2006).  By the 1990s, all of the major contract equipment manufacturers also came to 
China under similar arrangements.  According to the Tenth five Year Plan ending in 
2005, the Government planned to invest more than $ 120 billion in the IT industries in 
order to raise the share of the sector to 7% of GDP  (Walsh 2003: 71) 
 
The strategy has paid off. “By carefully nurturing its domestic computing industry 
through tightly controlled partnerships with foreign manufacturers,” concludes Dedrick,   
“China has become the fourth-largest computer maker in the world” (Dedrick and 
 51 
Kraemer 2002: 28). Table 12 shows that the majority of foreign electronics firms in 
China are either joint ventures or domestic/state-owned enterprises (SOEs).   
 
Given the large nature of the economy and the fact that China serves as an export 
platform, China has had a great deal of bargaining power vis-à-vis MNCs. First, China 
had location specific assets that could not be ignored.  Not only did China offer an export 
platform like Taiwan and South Korea did, but it also had a large and growing market at 
home which is a major bargaining chip.  In essence, foreign firms traded market access 
for technology transfer.  China’s domestic market is growing rapidly, propelled not only 
by a rise in personal income but also by active government promotion strategies as 
mentioned before.   
 
Table 12 
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Sector Foreign-Owned Joint-Ventures Domestic Firms and SOEs
Mobile Phones Motorola Motorola/Eastcom TLC
Nokia/Capitel, Southern
Siemens/Mil Subsidiaries
Samsung/Kejian
Sagem/Bird
PCs HP IBM/Great Wall Lenovo
Dell Toshiba/Toshiba Shanghai Founder
Epson/Start Tongfang
Taiwan GVC/TCL
"Brown Goods" Sony/SVA Changhong
Philips/Suzhou CTV Konka
Toshiba/Dalian Daxian Hisense
Great Wall Electronics/TCL Skyworth
Haier
Panda
Xoceco
"White Goods" Siemens Samsung/Suzhou Changling
Xianxuehai Gree
Electrolux/Changsha
LG/Chunlan
Mitsubishi/Haier
Sanyo/Kelon
Sigma/Meiling
Hong Leong/Xinfei
Toshiba Carrier/Midea
Source: Rodrik, 2006 .
China: Major Consumer Electronics Firms by Ownership Type
 
(Rodrik 2006)  
 
In addition to domestic market access, global MNCs have been willing to work in 
the confines of Chinese policy because of China’s active support for and subsidies to the 
high tech industry. According to a comprehensive study by Dussel Peters (2005), a key 
program has been the establishment of high tech industrial parks.  Much of the FDI flows 
to these parks where it is matched with national firms who are the recipients of numerous 
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incentives and assistance programs.  Despite the potential market pay-offs, foreign firms 
are now starting to get nervous about technology transfer arrangements, especially as 
Chinese IT firms begin to emerge as flagships. Indeed, OECD governments have begun 
to dub China’s policies as “forced transfers” and have undertaken investigations and task 
forces in order to eliminate or reduce them (USDOC 2006).   
 
Another key element of the strategy is a high level of support for high tech R&D 
and education.  According to MOST, the bulk of R&D expenditure have been allocated to 
IT industry. R&D funds are distributed to SOEs, local governments, and Chinese owned 
firms.  The 2004-2008 five year plan calls for increased subsidies to SOEs (MOST 2006: 
Table 5.2). Support for local government is targeted at the cities which house R&D 
centers within industrial parks. Local governments often match national government 
funding for R&D programs.  
 
In short, China’s high tech promotion strategy, had two prongs: build up 
capabilities of domestic firms and stimulate investment and technology transfer by 
MNCs.  And the results of China’s high tech program have been impressive.  By 1989, 
the Legend group had evolved into Legend Computer and formed a joint venture with 
Hewlett Packard. By 2000, Legend had emerged as the number one seller of personal 
computers in Asia Pacific and held more than 20 percent of the Chinese PC market.  In 
early 2005, Legend—morphed into Lenovo—acquired IBM’s global desktop and 
notebook computer divisions. With the IBM deal, Lenovo became, after Dell and HP, the 
world third largest PC maker (Spooner 2005). Hassee Computer is another fast growing 
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domestic computer firm. Domestic manufacturers together have dominated 70% of the 
market for PC sales (Walsh 2003: 108). Founder, became a leading firm in developing 
laser typesetting technologies and electronic publishing. Datang, is the leading company 
in development of 3G (TD-SCDMA) technology. Huawei is a giant maker of 
telecommunication equipment.  A collection of several domestic firms developed their 
own brand in Mobile telephone and high definition disc player (see below). Table 13 
exhibits a few other Chinese firms including lesser known ones that have made 
significant innovations. Despite numerous problems at the beginning, particularly the 
lack of recognition of their capabilities, and relative merits of their product, by Chinese 
customer, they succeeded to penetrate into the internal and international market. They 
were highly motivated to develop “leading technologies and leading products”; focused 
on a single product, collaborated with leading local firms provider of equipment and 
components, sought cooperation of MNCs and collaborated with their customers. 
Throughout the process government support was important (Gao et al. 2007). 
 
Table 13 
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Huawei Technology 1988 large-scale switch systems
next generation network
optimal network
data communication
Shenzhen Zhongxin Technology Co. 1985 large-scale switch systems
next generation network
TD-SCDMA
Datang Telecom Technology 1998 TD-SCDMA
SCDMA
Dawning Information Industry Co. 1995 Wormhole routing chip
parallel optimising compiler
scalability, usability, manageability, and availability (SUMA) tech
Beijing Genome Institute 2002 large-scale genome sequencing
Sibiono Gene Technology 1998 Gene therapy medication for head and neck squamos cell carcinoma
China National Petroleum Co. 1955 (1988) Integrated seismic data processing software
ABS technology
Top drive drilling equipment
Multi-branch horizontal and large displacement well drilling tech
Two-state catalytic cracking technology
Source: Fan et al (2007)
Leading Innovative Domestic High Technology Companies in China
Major technical acheivementsFoundingCompany Name
 
(Fan, Gao, and Watanabe 2007)  
 
Overall, by 2003, China’s electronics sector generated $142 billion in exports and 
employing four million workers.  Between 1993 and 2003, the growth rate of high tech 
exports was 50.2 percent for computers and peripherals, and 21.9 percent for 
telecommunications and related equipment (Table 13).  Like Lenovo, many Chinese 
firms started as State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and were gradually privatized as they 
gained capacity and competitiveness.  In 1993, 26 percent of computer and peripheral 
firms and 54 percent of telecommunications firms were SOEs.  By 2003, only 6 percent 
of computer and 18 percent of telecom firms were SOEs.   
 
Although national firms, including SOEs, are in the minority, they are filing and 
being granted more patent applications than foreign firms.  According to MOST, Chinese 
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firms were granted 112, 103 patents in 2002, whereas foreign firms were granted only 
20,296.  Close to half of these patents were in the form of utility models--patents for 
incremental innovations where local firms create variations on project and process 
execution.  This reveals that a significant amount of learning is going on in Chinese 
firms.  Another half however, is in the form of design patents, which were 49,143 in 2002 
(MOST 2006). 
 
IV.  Summary and Implications for Development Policy 
It is clear from this analysis that Mexico and China have followed very different 
policies for acquiring technological capabilities.  Mexico was the “champion of 
liberalization” but China’s may be described as neo-developmental—evocative but not a 
clean replication of the NIC developmental states (see: ECLAC 2001). Alongside reform, 
China put in place functional and targeted government policies.   
 
Perhaps more importantly, we have shown how Mexico’s was a policy of dismantling a 
past set of policies, China’s was a strategy of building new policies for the future.  
Mexico knew where it wanted to be and thought it had an easy way to get there: 
dismantle the old policies and then learning and growth would follow.  China also had the 
same goal but was more modest about how to get there.  China has embarked on a two 
pronged policies. While reforming the economy, it has taken a more gradual and 
experimental approach to liberalization and integration into the world economy. 
Meanwhile, it has continued a parallel set of targeted policies in support of development 
of indigenous capabilities for technological learning.  
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 As early as 1990, the Mexican Government relinquished all interference in the 
technology process leaving it entirely to the parties involved in FDI; and MNCs were 
provided various incentive, particularly in export processing zones, without commitment 
for performance. Economic liberalism also led to reduction in government investment in 
R&D, education and training. The assumption was that the market forces would take care 
of these issues.  
 
 Through trial and error China has learned that reliance on market forces and FDI 
alone will not automatically lead to the transfer of technology and increase value added in 
exports. There was a need for developing the capabilities of domestic firms. While 
formulating and implementing a comprehensive, but selective and targeted strategy, 
aiming in particular at IT industries, the Government developed an institutional 
framework for S&T development and a dynamic national system of innovation. It 
consisted of the Chinese Academy of Science, relevant ministries, the private enterprises, 
universities and research institutes. Close links were established among these entities in 
the public and private sectors. Both basic research, and application and diffusion of 
technology have been emphasized right from early 1980s.  
 
 A shortcoming of this paper is the lack of ability to examine in full the 
independent effect government these policies on learning and industrialization relative to 
other facts—such an undertaking is an impossible one given the limits of current data and 
methods.  Nevertheless, the results of our study are consistent with those of a number of 
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other empirical studies in the TCB literature of capability building theory and other Neo-
developmentalists (Wade 1990; Paus 2005; Puyana and Romero 2006; Amsden 2000; 
Paus and Gallagher 2008; Singh 1993; Chang 2005; Shafaeddin 2005; Lall 2005). This 
body of literature makes a strong case for the need for nurturing of domestic firms in a 
globalizing world.  The contrast in philosophy and policy for Mexico and China 
decisively confirms that general finding.   
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Appendix 
Table A.1: Applications for Patents received and the number of patent granted in China 
 
Items
Examined Granted Examined Granted Examined Granted
Inventions 10137 3838 51747 12683 173327 53305
   Domestic 5832 1149 25346 6177 93485 20705
   Foreign 4305 2689 26401 6506 79842 32600
Utility models 27615 16952 68815 54743 139566 79349
  Domestic 27488 16744 68461 54407 138085 78137
  Foreign 127 11644 354 336 1481 48946
Design 3717 1798 50120 37919 163371 81349
  Domestic 3265 1411 46532 34652 151587 72777
  Foreign 452 387 3588 3267 11784 8572
Total 41469 22588 170682 105345 476264 214003
   Domestic 36585 19304 140339 95236 383157 171619
   Foreign 4884 3248 30343 10109 93089 42384
Share of domestic (%) 88.2 85.5 82.2 90.4 80.4 80.2
1990 2000 2005
 
 
Sources: (People's Republic of China 2006: Tables 21-44 and 21-46).   
                                                 
1
 For more details on List’s ideas see (Shafaeddin 2005) particularly pp 47-50. 
 
2
 See for example the reference in (Bruton 1998: 930).  There are at least two versions of the theory, TCB 
and (Lazonick 1991). Lazonick’s theory is concerned basically with large firms of developed countries and 
thus not discussed here.  
 
3.For a good presentation and development of the theory see (Lall 1993)  
 
 
4
 For more details see (Pizarro and Shafaeddin 2007) 
 
5
 They were mainly located in Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen. 67% of 33392 high-tech enterprises were 
located in high-tech parks (Fan, Gao, and Watanabe 2007: 356).  
 
6
 The terminal year for China was 2005.  
 
7
 These include Huawei, Shenzhen Zhongxin, Datang, Dawning, Beijing Genom Institutes and China 
National Petroleum.(see: Fan, Gao, and Watanabe 2007) 
 
8
 Based on (People's Republic of China 2006), tables 21-13 and 21-9 
 
9
 SOEs have also had social objectives (see Lia and Xia,2008). 
 
10
 .They include Intel, SAP, Motorala, Lucent, Turbolinux, Nokia, IBM,Ericson, Agilent, Mirosoft, 
Matsushita, NEC and Samsung (Chen 2008: Table A1).  
 
11
 For a brief history of development of the industry up to 1993 see (Ye 2008).  
